Trump sought Schumer’s support to rename Dulles, Penn Station after him for tunnel funds: Reports by Alexander Bolton

 The Amazon founder bought the paper to save it. Instead, with a mass layoff, he’s forced it into severe decline.

 

President Trump told Senate Democratic Leader Chuck Schumer (N.Y.) last month that he would drop his hold on more than $16 billion in funding for the Gateway tunnel project connecting New York and New Jersey if Schumer agreed to rename Penn Station and Washington Dulles International Airport, according to reports.

Schumer immediately rejected the proposal, explaining to the president that it was beyond his authority to advance the Trump’s unusual request, according to sources cited by Punchbowl News and CNN.

 

New York Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D) called the president’s proposal “ridiculous.”

“These naming rights aren’t tradable as part of any negotiations, and neither is the dignity of New Yorkers,” Gillibrand said in a statement. “At a time when New Yorkers are already being crushed by high costs under the Trump tariffs, the president continues to put his own narcissism over the good-paying union jobs this project provides and the extraordinary economic impact the Gateway tunnel will bring.”

Trump met with Schumer in mid-January at the president‘s request to discuss the administration‘s hold on the Gateway tunnel project funding.

 

The New York Democrat at the meeting urged Trump to press Senate Republicans to approve a three-year extension of the enhanced Affordable Care Act tax credits that expired at the end of 2025.

He also told the president that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids to deport immigrants from Minnesota and other cities are “terrorizing communities,” according to his office. Schumer urged Trump to pull back ICE officers from Minneapolis.

Democrats have reacted angrily to Trump’s decision to add his name to Washington’s famous John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. The move has led to several performers pulling out of scheduled events at the venue.

 

Schumer, House Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries (N.Y.) and other Democrats, such as Sens. Sheldon Whitehouse (R.I.) and Mark Warner (Va.), condemned the president’s attempt to name the center after himself.

Whitehouse, the ranking member of the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee, released a statement this week protesting the announcement that the Kennedy Center would close for two weeks for renovations.

He accused Trump of “bucking rules and convention” to “commandeer the Kennedy Center as a clubhouse for his friends and political allies.”

The president has also faced backlash over adding his name to the U.S. Institute of Peace and after demolition began on the White House’s East Wing for Trump’s massive ballroom project.

 

 

Powerful people, random redactions: 4 things to know about the latest Epstein files BY Stephen Fowler , Jaclyn Diaz

 

The release of millions of pages of Epstein files Friday has raised more questions than it has answered.

Convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein's private communications continue to reveal the web of powerful figures who sought his friendship and counsel. Internal notes from the Justice Department show the extent of allegations made against Epstein — but also against others who have not faced criminal charges for sex trafficking.

Speaking on CNN's State of the Union on Sunday, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche said new charges for anyone are unlikely.

"I can't talk about any investigations, but I will say the following, which is that in July, the Department of Justice said that we had reviewed the 'Epstein files,' and there was nothing in there that allowed us to prosecute anybody," he said. "We then released over 3 1/2 million pieces of paper, which the entire world can look at now and see if we got it wrong."

 

Here are four takeaways from the latest release of the Epstein files.

The files aren't organized and have issues with redactions

NPR's review of the documents has found numerous examples of the Justice Department failing to redact names of publicly identified victims of sexual abuse as well as names of individuals who have not previously been publicized.

The Epstein Files Transparency Act, signed by President Trump last year, called for the Justice Department to minimize its redactions while turning over information about the life and death of Epstein and the criminal charges he and his accomplice Ghislaine Maxwell faced. Maxwell is serving a 20-year sentence in federal prison for sexual exploitation and trafficking of children, crimes she committed with Epstein.

Those redactions, too, are inconsistent with what the law directs.

"In addition to the documentary redactions, which includes personal identifying information, victim information and other privileges, there is extensive redaction to images and videos to protect victims," Blanche said Friday, announcing the final batch of files. "We redacted every woman depicted in any image or video, with the exception of Ms. Maxwell. We did not redact images of any men unless it was impossible to redact the woman without also redacting the man."

 But multiple examples can be found in the Epstein files repository that show the faces of women and hide the faces of men, including one text message conversation between former Trump adviser Steve Bannon and Epstein where Trump's face in a news article was obscured with a black box.

 

The files aren't shared in chronological order or grouped in any identifiable way. Countless duplicate copies of email threads, investigative files and correspondence are spread throughout the database, sometimes with different levels of redactions applied.

The same PowerPoint presentation prepared last fall by the Justice Department detailing the timeline and cases against Epstein and Maxwell, alleged victims and powerful figures in his orbit who faced allegations of misconduct appears six times with different information blocked out in each version.

 

Annie Farmer, one of the women who testified in court against Epstein and Maxwell, told NPR's All Things Considered on Monday that the redaction issues felt intentional.

"There's just no explanation for how it could've been done so poorly," she said. "They've had victims' names for a very long time. I don't think this is just about rushing to get this information out."

A Department of Justice spokesperson said in a statement to NPR that the department "takes victim protection very seriously and has redacted thousands of victim names in the millions of published pages to protect the innocent."

"The Department had 500 reviewers looking at millions of pages for this very reason, to meet the requirements of the act while protecting victims," the statement reads. "When a victim's name is alleged to be unredacted, our team is working around the clock to fix the issue and republish appropriately redacted pages as soon as possible. To date, 0.1% of released pages have been found to have victim identifying information unredacted."

That number, if taken at face value, would suggest more than 3,000 pages revealed sensitive information about Epstein victims.

A federal judge in New York will hold a hearing Wednesday morning on a request from victims' lawyers to shut down the dedicated website for the trove of documents until all victim information is removed. Several files NPR previously identified that contained personally identifying information have since been removed.

 

Epstein's connections are vast and personal

Epstein surrounded himself with wealthy and influential people throughout his life from a variety of disciplines and ideologies. A revealing prison psychiatric evaluation, published following his death by suicide while awaiting a federal trial in 2019, said the enigmatic financier had few close friends, despite having a huge social circle.

"He had been a successful, wealthy businessman with a number of high-profile acquaintances that he accumulated through a combination of charisma, charm, and intelligence. Despite his many associates, he had limited significant or deep interpersonal ties," the evaluation said. "Although Mr. Epstein appeared to cultivate a large social and professional network, he was estranged from his only brother. Indeed, his identity appeared to be based on his wealth, power, and association with other high profile individuals."

The more than 3 million pages released by the Justice Department last Friday show how many of his relationships with prominent figures in Hollywood, finance and politics continued well after Epstein was convicted in Florida in 2008 of sex crimes. Appearing in the files and in communications with Epstein is not an indication of wrongdoing or knowledge of Epstein's crimes.

Epstein and billionaire Elon Musk were in contact several times over many years, according to these documents, including several unsuccessful attempts for the two to meet.

"What day/night will be the wildest party on your island?," Musk asked in 2012.

"sorry we didn't connect," Epstein wrote a few weeks later.

The newest batch of files includes numerous messages with the spiritualist Deepak Chopra about his finances, notes from a meeting with the founder of popular image board 4chan, Christopher Poole, and more conversations with figures like former Obama White House counsel Kathryn Ruemmler and former Clinton Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, who have already faced scrutiny for their Epstein ties.

A look into Epstein's finances

Epstein's notoriety stems in part from his work as a financial adviser and his sizable wealth.

 

The new files fill in some pictures about his money and how he used it. As a child, Epstein attended the Interlochen Center of the Arts, a nonprofit that runs an arts-focused school and summer camp, in the summer of 1967. Records show Epstein participated in programs for the bassoon, radio and orchestra.

These records from Interlochen released by the DOJ also show that Epstein donated close to $400,000 to the center, which has a campus in Michigan, from 1990 to 2003.

Epstein's history at the camp and years of donations were confirmed by the center last December. The organization said it distanced itself from Epstein after his conviction in 2008.

 

The organization said, "Interlochen conducted an internal review and found no record of complaint or concern about Epstein. All donor recognition in his name was removed from campus at that time. Subsequent to Epstein's second arrest in July 2019, we again reviewed our records and found no report or complaint involving Epstein within our records."

Epstein and his ex-girlfriend and accomplice Ghislaine Maxwell are alleged to have used the Interlochen campus as a hunting ground, however. During Maxwell's criminal trial, a woman testified that she met the couple when she was a girl while in between classes at the camp in the early '90s. The couple gained her mother's trust and when she returned home to Florida, the girl and her mother visited Epstein and Maxwell. Afterward the girl said she was groomed and sexually abused.

Interlochen said in a statement following this testimony, "No abuse is alleged to have taken place on the Interlochen campus. Our policies, then and now, do not permit unsupervised contact between students and donors."

Epstein updated his trust two days before death

 Just two days before his death by suicide in a Manhattan jail cell Aug. 10, 2019, Epstein updated his will for the last time. He planned to dole out his considerable wealth to a host of friends, employees, business associates and his brother's children upon his death.

 

The deceased sex offender and disgraced financier's trust, which was not previously made public, details how Epstein wanted his millions of dollars, and his properties including the infamous Little Saint James Island in the U.S. Virgin Islands, distributed to at least 44 people.

Epstein signed his trust on Aug. 8, 2019. The document was signed by his longtime lawyer Darren Indyke on Aug. 18, 2019, eight days after Epstein's death. His accountant, Richard Kahn, signed it two days later.

Under this trust, Indyke was set to get $50 million and Kahn $25 million.

Epstein's last known girlfriend, Karyna Shuliak, was set to get the bulk of Epstein's fortune, including $50 million outright a year after his death, his New Mexico Zorro Ranch property, his two properties in the U.S. Virgin Islands, his Paris apartment, his Palm Beach home and his Upper East Side townhouse in Manhattan.

Epstein also bequeathed Shuliak multiple pieces of jewelry, including an almost 33 carat diamond ring and 48 separate loose diamonds previously given to her "in contemplation of marriage," the trust says in a handwritten note in blue ink.

Maxwell and Epstein's brother were set to get $10 million each, with Mark Epstein's share intended to go to a trust to benefit his children.

It's unclear how much money each of these beneficiaries actually received following Epstein's death. At the time of his death, his estate was valued at close to $600 million, according to court documents from the U.S. Virgin Islands. But after he died, victims of Epstein received more than $120 million from a fund dedicated to compensating more than 100 victims.

According to the records released by the DOJ, the former billionaire updated and amended his will and trust more than two dozen times over many years. The regular changes offer some insight on the prominent people who circled in and out of Epstein's inner circle over the years.

In a version of Epstein's trust from 2012, Jean Luc Brunel, a modeling scout and close associate of Epstein's for decades, is listed as getting as much as $5 million.

Brunel was arrested in 2020 by French authorities and held on charges of rape of minors and trafficking of minors for sexual exploitation. Before he could face trial, he died by suicide in a French jail cell.

Brunel denied any wrongdoing.

 

 

America is falling behind in the global EV race – that’s going to cost the US auto industry by Hengrui Liu /Kelly Sims Gallagher

At the 2026 Detroit Auto Show, the spotlight quietly shifted. Electric vehicles, once framed as the inevitable future of the industry, were no longer the centerpiece. Instead, automakers emphasized hybrids, updated gasoline models and incremental efficiency improvements.

The show, held in January, reflected an industry recalibration happening in real time: Ford and General Motors had recently announced US$19.5 billion and $6 billion in EV-related write-downs, respectively, reflecting the losses they expect as they unwind or delay parts of their electric vehicle plans.

The message from Detroit was unmistakable: The United States is pulling back from a transition that much of the world is accelerating.

 

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At the 2026 Detroit Auto Show, the spotlight quietly shifted. Electric vehicles, once framed as the inevitable future of the industry, were no longer the centerpiece. Instead, automakers emphasized hybrids, updated gasoline models and incremental efficiency improvements.

The show, held in January, reflected an industry recalibration happening in real time: Ford and General Motors had recently announced US$19.5 billion and $6 billion in EV-related write-downs, respectively, reflecting the losses they expect as they unwind or delay parts of their electric vehicle plans.

The message from Detroit was unmistakable: The United States is pulling back from a transition that much of the world is accelerating.

One great story in your inbox every afternoon

Highlights from the Detroit Auto Show, starting with V-8 trucks, by the Detroit Free Press’ auto writer.

That retreat carries consequences far beyond showroom floors.

In China, Europe and a growing number of emerging markets, including Vietnam and Indonesia, electric vehicles now make up a higher share of new passenger vehicle sales than in the United States.

That means the U.S. pullback on EV production is not simply a climate problem – gasoline-powered vehicles are a major contributor to climate change – it is also an industrial competitiveness problem, with direct implications for the future of U.S. automakers, suppliers and autoworkers. Slower EV production and slower adoption in the U.S. can keep prices higher, delay improvements in batteries and software, and increase the risk that the next generation of automotive value creation will happen elsewhere.

Where EVs are taking over

In 2025, global EV registrations rose 20% to 20.7 million. Analysts with Benchmark Mineral Intelligence reported that China reached 12.9 million EV registrations, up 17% from the previous year; Europe recorded 4.3 million, up 33%; and the rest of the world added 1.7 million, up 48%.

By contrast, U.S. EV sales growth was essentially flat in 2025, at about 1%. U.S. automaker Tesla experienced declines in both scale and profitability – its vehicle deliveries fell 9% compared to 2024, the company’s net profit was down 46%, and CEO Elon Musk said it would put more of its focus on artificial intelligence and robotics.

 

Market share tells a similar story and also challenges the assumption that vehicle electrification would take time to expand from wealthy countries to emerging markets.

In 39 countries, EVs now exceed 10% of new car sales, including in Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia, which reached 38%, 21% and 15%, respectively, in 2025, energy analysts at Ember report.

In the U.S., EVs accounted for less than 10% of new vehicle sales, by Ember’s estimates. 

 U.S. President Donald Trump came back into office in 2025 promising to end policies that supported EV production and sales and boost fossil fuels. But while the U.S. was curtailing federal consumer incentives, governments elsewhere largely continued a transition to electric vehicles.

Europe softened its goal for all vehicles to have zero emissions by 2035 at the urging of automakers, but its new target is still a 90% cut in automobiles’ carbon dioxide emissions by 2035.

Germany launched a program offering subsidies worth 1,500 to 6,000 euros per electric vehicle, aimed at small- and medium-income households.

In developing economies, EV policy has largely been sustained through industrial policies. In Brazil, the MOVER program offers tax credits explicitly linked to domestic EV production, research and development, and efficiency targets. South Africa is introducing a 150% investment allowance for EV and battery manufacturing, giving them a tax break starting in March 2026. Thailand has implemented subsidies and reduced excise tax tied to mandatory local production and export commitments.

 

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At the 2026 Detroit Auto Show, the spotlight quietly shifted. Electric vehicles, once framed as the inevitable future of the industry, were no longer the centerpiece. Instead, automakers emphasized hybrids, updated gasoline models and incremental efficiency improvements.

The show, held in January, reflected an industry recalibration happening in real time: Ford and General Motors had recently announced US$19.5 billion and $6 billion in EV-related write-downs, respectively, reflecting the losses they expect as they unwind or delay parts of their electric vehicle plans.

The message from Detroit was unmistakable: The United States is pulling back from a transition that much of the world is accelerating.

One great story in your inbox every afternoon

Highlights from the Detroit Auto Show, starting with V-8 trucks, by the Detroit Free Press’ auto writer.

That retreat carries consequences far beyond showroom floors.

In China, Europe and a growing number of emerging markets, including Vietnam and Indonesia, electric vehicles now make up a higher share of new passenger vehicle sales than in the United States.

That means the U.S. pullback on EV production is not simply a climate problem – gasoline-powered vehicles are a major contributor to climate change – it is also an industrial competitiveness problem, with direct implications for the future of U.S. automakers, suppliers and autoworkers. Slower EV production and slower adoption in the U.S. can keep prices higher, delay improvements in batteries and software, and increase the risk that the next generation of automotive value creation will happen elsewhere.

Where EVs are taking over

In 2025, global EV registrations rose 20% to 20.7 million. Analysts with Benchmark Mineral Intelligence reported that China reached 12.9 million EV registrations, up 17% from the previous year; Europe recorded 4.3 million, up 33%; and the rest of the world added 1.7 million, up 48%.

By contrast, U.S. EV sales growth was essentially flat in 2025, at about 1%. U.S. automaker Tesla experienced declines in both scale and profitability – its vehicle deliveries fell 9% compared to 2024, the company’s net profit was down 46%, and CEO Elon Musk said it would put more of its focus on artificial intelligence and robotics.

Market share tells a similar story and also challenges the assumption that vehicle electrification would take time to expand from wealthy countries to emerging markets.

In 39 countries, EVs now exceed 10% of new car sales, including in Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia, which reached 38%, 21% and 15%, respectively, in 2025, energy analysts at Ember report.

In the U.S., EVs accounted for less than 10% of new vehicle sales, by Ember’s estimates.

U.S. President Donald Trump came back into office in 2025 promising to end policies that supported EV production and sales and boost fossil fuels. But while the U.S. was curtailing federal consumer incentives, governments elsewhere largely continued a transition to electric vehicles.

Europe softened its goal for all vehicles to have zero emissions by 2035 at the urging of automakers, but its new target is still a 90% cut in automobiles’ carbon dioxide emissions by 2035.

Germany launched a program offering subsidies worth 1,500 to 6,000 euros per electric vehicle, aimed at small- and medium-income households.

In developing economies, EV policy has largely been sustained through industrial policies. In Brazil, the MOVER program offers tax credits explicitly linked to domestic EV production, research and development, and efficiency targets. South Africa is introducing a 150% investment allowance for EV and battery manufacturing, giving them a tax break starting in March 2026. Thailand has implemented subsidies and reduced excise tax tied to mandatory local production and export commitments.

Low prices from Chinese automakers such as BYD helped the EV industry take off, not just in China but globally. A car priced at 99,800 yuan is just over US$14,000. These were at an auto show in Yantai, in eastern China, in April 2025. Stringer/AFP via Getty Images

In China, the EV industry has entered a phase of regulatory maturity. After a decade of subsidies and state-led investment that helped domestic firms undercut global competitors, the government’s focus is no longer on explosive growth at home.

With their domestic market saturated and competition fierce, Chinese automakers are pushing aggressively into global markets. Beijing has reinforced this shift by ending its full tax exemption for EV purchases and replacing it with a tapered 5% tax on EV buyers.

Consequences for US automakers

EV manufacturing is governed by steep learning curves and scale economies, meaning the more vehicles a company builds, the better it gets at making them faster and cheaper. Low domestic production and sales can mean higher costs for parts and weaker bargaining power for automakers in global supply chains.

The competitive landscape is already changing. In 2025, China exported 2.65 million EVs, doubling its 2024 exports, according to the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers. And BYD surpassed Tesla as the world’s largest EV maker in 2025. 

 

The U.S. risks becoming a follower in the industry it once defined.

Some people argue that American consumers simply prefer trucks and hybrids. Others point to Chinese subsidies and overcapacity as distortions that justify U.S. industry caution. These concerns deserve consideration, but they do not outweigh the fundamental fact that, globally, the EV share of auto sales continues to rise.

What can the US do?

For U.S. automakers and workers to compete in this market, the government, in our view, will have to stop treating EVs as an ideological matter and start governing it like an industrial transition.

That starts with restoring regulatory credibility, something that seems unlikely right now as the Trump administration moves to roll back vehicle emissions standards. Performance standards are the quiet engine of industrial investment. When standards are predictable and enforced, manufacturers can plan, suppliers can invest in new businesses, and workers can train for reliable demand.

Governments at state and local levels and industry can also take important steps.

Focus on affordability and equity: The federal clean-vehicle tax credit that effectively gave EV buyers a discount expired in September 2025. An alternative is targeted, point-of-sale support for lower- and middle-income buyers. By moving away from blanket credits in favor of targeted incentives – a model already used in California and Pennsylvania – governments can ensure public funds are directed toward people who are currently priced out of the EV market. Additionally, interest-rate buydowns that allow buyers to reduce their loan payments and “green loan” programs can help, typically funded through state and local governments, utility companies or federal grants.

Keep building out the charging network: A federal judge ruled on Jan. 23, 2026, that the Trump administration violated the law when it suspended a $5 billion program for expanding the nation’s EV charger network. That expansion effort can be improved by shifting the focus from the number of ports installed to the number of working chargers, as California did in 2025. Enforcing reliability and clearing bottlenecks, such as electricity connections and payment systems, could help boost the number of functioning sites.

Use fleet procurement as a stabilizer for U.S. sales: When states, cities and companies provide a predictable volume of vehicle purchases, that helps manufacturers plan future investments. For example, Amazon’s 2019 order of 100,000 Rivian electric delivery vehicles to be delivered over the following decade gave the startup automaker the boost it needed.

Treat workforce transition as core infrastructure: This means giving workers skills they can carry from job to job, helping suppliers retool instead of shutting down, and coordinating training with employers’ needs. Done right, these investments turn economic change into a source of stable jobs and broad public support. Done poorly, they risk a political backlash.

The scene at the Detroit Auto Show should be a warning, not a verdict. The global auto industry is accelerating its EV transition. The question for the United States is whether it will shape that future – and ensure the technologies and jobs of the next automotive era are in the U.S. – or import it.

Macroeconomic implications of immigration flows in 2025 and 2026: January 2026 update by Wendy Edelberg, Wendy Edelberg headshot Wendy Edelberg Senior Fellow - Economic Studies Stan Veuger, and Tara Watson

 

The first year of the second Trump administration has seen dramatic changes in immigration policy, resulting in a sharp slowdown in net migration to the United States. We expect the pattern of restrictive policy and increased enforcement to continue or intensify through the coming year. Building on work released in late 2024 and mid-2025, we use available data combined with judgment to estimate a range of likely outcomes for net migration for the years 2025 and 2026. We conclude that net migration was likely close to zero or negative over calendar year 2025 for the first time in at least half a century. Specifically, we estimate that net migration was between –295,000 and -10,000 for the year. For 2026, we project net migration is likely to remain in negative territory. These figures come with the caveat that recent reductions in data transparency make the estimates more uncertain.

The downward population pressure stemming from negative net migration has important implications for the macroeconomy. In recent years, growth in the U.S.-born working-age population has been weak, and nearly all growth in the labor force has stemmed from immigration flows. The 2022–24 immigration surge was accompanied by robust job growth, with immigrants both supplying labor and generating demand for goods and services. Conversely, the recent slowdown in population growth has affected the level of employment growth consistent with an unchanged unemployment rate, often called “breakeven employment growth.” We estimate that, in the second half of 2025, breakeven employment growth of 20,000 to 50,000 jobs each month was consistent with immigration flows. That number could dip into negative territory over 2026. Reduced immigration also has modest dampening effects on GDP and will weaken consumer spending by an estimated $60–$110 billion combined over the two years.  

Immigration flows in 2025 and 2026

To estimate net migration, we separately consider inflows and outflows in “low immigration” and “high immigration” scenarios. Though deportations and other exits receive more media attention, a slowdown in new arrivals, especially via humanitarian parole and refugee programs and across the Southwest border, has a bigger effect on reducing migration flows in 2025.

Our results suggest that net immigration likely ranged between –295,000 and –10,000 for 2025. For 2026, we project that net immigration will likely range between –925,000 and +185,000. In Figure 1, we compare those outcomes to net immigration since 2020, a year when immigration was constrained because of the pandemic. After reaching a roughly normal pace in 2021, immigration surged from 2022 to 2024.

 Inflows – Green cards issued abroad. The U.S. issues a variety of permanent visas—including family-based green cards, employment-based green cards, and diversity visas. Roughly half are issued to those already living in the United States. Monthly totals of green cards issued to individuals abroad are released by the U.S. State Department. The data have not been updated since May 2025. We can, however, see a marked year-over-year decline of more than 20% by May 2025 relative to May 2024. The average of April and May was 82% of the previous April and May.

 We assume in the high-immigration scenario that monthly green cards issued from June through December 2025 are 82% of what they were for the same month in 2024. In the low scenario, we assume the number was further reduced to 95% of the high scenario. The resulting estimate is that there were 560,000 to 575,000 green cards issued abroad in 2025, compared to about 670,000 in 2024.

 For 2026, we assume that green card inflows could continue to fall as the result of January 1 expansions in the list of countries under full or partial travel bans, increased vetting and paperwork, and other forms of sand in the gears. In the low scenario, we assume 2026 flows will reach only 87.5% of 2025 low scenario flows, or about 490,000. The travel ban is expected to affect 20% of immigrants, but for some categories of immigrants, they likely will be replaced by immigrants from other countries, so we assumed a smaller than 20% drop-off in the category. In the high scenario, we assume the total number of green cards will continue at its 2025 high level, or 575,000, reflecting the possibility that the policy will not be implemented.

 

Inflows – Refugees. Though some refugees were likely admitted in early January 2025, the current administration has all but suspended the refugee program, with an exception for an unknown number of white South Africans. Data on the number of refugees are no longer publicly available. We assume that the total number of refugees for 2025 was between 7,600 and 12,000 and that the 2026 number will fall to between 1,200 and 7,500. For comparison, around 105,000 refugees were admitted in 2024.

Inflows – Temporary visas. The U.S. admits a large number of people through various non-immigrant (temporary) visa programs — including student visas, temporary work visas such as the H-2A and H-1B, and a variety of others. Excluding those for short-term tourism and business, about 2.17 million non-immigrant visas were issued in 2024. Data have not been released since May 2025, but year-over-year comparison suggests a monthly slowdown. In the high scenario, we assume the April-May reduction to 89% of the prior year monthly values persists for the rest of the year. In the low scenario, the figure is further reduced to 95% of the high scenario. The resulting range is 1.94–1.99 million temporary visa inflows.

For 2026, the low scenario assumes the number will decline further to 85% of the 2025 value, reflecting travel bans and other deterrents for a range of 1.65–1.99 million.

Inflows – Parole and notices to appear. Between 2022 and summer 2024, large numbers of border arrivals at or between ports of entry were allowed to enter the U.S., often granted a temporary parole status or given a notice to appear (NTA) in immigration court. Many of these arrivals expressed fear of returning to their home country and intended to pursue an asylum claim once in the United States.

These inflows fell substantially after a change in border policy in mid-2024 and have fallen further still with the new administration’s policies. The administration has not been considering most credible fear claims which would allow people to petition for asylum. It has also eliminated Biden-era humanitarian parole programs. Border information is updated monthly, so we have a good estimate of 2025 parole/NTA inflows at around 67,000 to 70,000, with many of those in the first month of the year. For comparison, the 2024 number was 1.41 million. For 2026, we assume these border entries will remain low at 26,000 to 53,000.

Inflows – Entries without inspection. Entries without inspection (border crossers who do not encounter any official) are inherently difficult to measure. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security uses technology and information on encounters to estimate this number but has not publicly released statistics in several years. For 2024, we rely on the recently released Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimate of 270,000, which we believe to be reasonable. Work by David Bier suggests that entries without inspection fell substantially after the end of the Title 42 public health restrictions in 2023, with more people instead encountering an official and often receiving a parole or notice to appear.

In 2025, the number of people encountering a border official fell dramatically, despite increased patrolling. This implies a sharp slowdown in the number of attempted border entries. Using a historical ratio (from 2015 to 2019, or just 2019) of encounters to estimated entries without inspection, we estimate 2025 entries without inspection to be between 22,000 and 39,000. For 2026, we believe this number could potentially increase in the high scenario given elevated geopolitical uncertainty and innovation in smuggler networks. For 2026, we assume a range of entries without inspection of 22,000 to 150,000.

 

Outflows – Normal out-migration. Outflows are harder to measure than inflows. Detailed statistics are not kept on those who leave, especially those who exit across a land border. We assume that immigrants who have stayed in the country more than two years and newly arrived green card holders and refugees have an annual baseline outmigration rate of 2.5%, an estimate informed by examining cohorts in the American Community Survey and research using tax records. Given their more precarious status, we assume recent arrivals with a notice to appear in immigration court or parole have an exit rate of 3%, and recent entries without inspection a rate of 4%. Recently arrived temporary visa holders are assumed to leave at a rate of 20%, reflecting the fact that almost all temporary visa holders transition to another legal status or exit according to the terms of their visa. By assumption, the level of normal outflows is mechanically reduced when the foreign-born population shrinks and when a smaller fraction of the foreign-born population has arrived within the last two years.

Outflows – Removals. Though official data is less available than in the past, we use information through July from the Deportation Data Project and data through November from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention management reports. We estimate 310,000 to 315,000 removals for 2025. This estimate is lower than some public statements from the administration, as discussed below, potentially in part because it is limited to border and interior removals executed by ICE.

Information provided by the Deportation Data Project makes it possible to have a consistent monthly removal series over time. The dataset excludes noncitizens processed for expedited removal or voluntary return without entering ICE custody; those excluded are largely border encounters leading to immediate removal, which would not have been considered entries in our analysis. Border encounters transferred to ICE are included. From January to July, removals reported in the Deportation Data Project are 87% of those reported in the ICE detention management reports. As a result, to generate a consistent estimate for removals from August through November, we infer monthly removals from ICE detention management report updates and multiply by 87% to make the two sources more comparable. Then, we estimate that removals in December are the same as in November or 10% higher.

At 310,000 to 315,000, the 2025 removals are not much higher than the 2024 removals of around 285,000. The nature of these removals has changed, however. In fiscal year 2024, only 18% of ICE removals were initiated by ICE as opposed to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, meaning the vast majority of ICE deportations were of recent border crossers. Comparable statistics have not been released for 2025, but it is clear from border statistics and other evidence that most removals in 2025 were from the nation’s interior.

For 2026, we assume removals will again be around 310,000 or will increase. Our low-immigration scenario assumes that about 510,000 individuals will be deported in 2026, consistent with a daily removal rate of around 1,400 people. This scenario suggests amplification beyond the second half of 2025 when the average was just under 1,000 per day. Funding in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act will likely allow for increased infrastructure and staffing to achieve a higher level of enforcement in 2026.

Outflows – Voluntary response to enforcement. Immigrants may respond to the enforcement environment even if they are not formally removed. For example, some immigration court cases end in “voluntary departure,” which carries fewer long-run penalties than an official removal. Using data from the Transaction Records Access Clearinghouse, we see that there were around 40,000 such court resolutions in 2025, compared to around 10,000 in 2024.

In addition, immigrants may choose to leave the United States if a family member is deported or may decide that leaving is a better option than risking detention or permanent family separation. Even those with legal status may choose to exit in a high-enforcement environment to avoid harassment or to find a more welcoming community. For example, graduating students may choose another global destination. At the same time, some may choose to avoid leaving the United States because of fears that there will be no means of re-entry, as is believed to have been the response during the 1990s increases in border enforcement.

There is little data to assess the degree to which immigrants have increased their voluntary exit rates in 2025 in response to the policy environment. Given the very different context from the circular migration common in the 1990s, our assessment is that greater border and interior enforcement will cause more out-migration. We assume proportional responses to deportations based on immigrant category, with those without legal status and recent arrivals more likely exit in response to enforcement. Our estimates suggest that between 210,000 to 405,000 left voluntarily in 2025 beyond what would have been normally expected without enforcement activity. For 2026, that number could reach 575,000 if the number of removals continues to increase.

Contrasting estimates of net migration in 2025

Our estimate of net migration of –295,000 to –10,000 for 2025 differs from some other prominent estimates. The most recent version of the CBO demographic estimates, released in January 2026, suggests net migration of around +400,000 for 2025. The CBO estimate includes fewer deportations than our estimate, and CBO also assumes voluntary out-migration falls in response to increased enforcement activity, whereas we assume it rises. Our midpoint estimates are about 550,000 lower than those of CBO.

Other estimates are much more negative than our own, notably those using Current Population Survey (CPS) data to examine the foreign-born population. For example, the CPS has been used by the Center for Immigration Studies and the Pew Research Center to estimate a decline in the foreign-born population of around 2 million. (Note that net immigration is not directly comparable to the change in the foreign-born population because the population figure also includes mortality, but this population number implies negative net migration of at least 1.5 million.) 

However, as detailed by Jed Kolko and in forthcoming work by some of the authors of this piece, the CPS should not be used to infer anything about population levels. By construction, the CPS methodology uses pre-determined fixed “population controls.” The population levels for each month of 2025 in that survey were projected in late 2024, as were subpopulations by race/ethnicity and age, before it was known what would happen to immigration flows. The same CPS data that underlie the foreign-born population decline of 2 million, therefore imply an implausible rise in the U.S.-born population of more than 2 million (because the pre-determined overall population growth is positive). The CPS challenges are compounded by increased survey non-response which likely disproportionately affects immigrants in the current policy environment. Given the many issues with the CPS data (and indeed a warning from Census against using the CPS to estimate the size of the foreign-born population), we believe the analyses using the CPS substantially overstate the drop in the foreign-born population and therefore imply net migration that is also too far in negative territory.

 

A December 2025 U.S. Department of Homeland Security announcement claimed 2.5 million illegal aliens left the United States in 2025. This number is the sum of what is likely an estimate based on the CPS data (1.9 million) and a measure of removals (622,000).  As noted above, the population estimates using the CPS are flawed. Even if correct, they involve the total foreign-born population of both legal and undocumented immigrants. They would also reflect deaths and both voluntary out-migration and forced departures. There would therefore be no reason to add a measure of removals to the estimated CPS population decline. Finally, the measure of removals used in this news release is nearly double that in ICE’s FY 2025 and FY 2026 detention statistics, suggesting the removal statistic cited may include rapid border removals and other enforcement activity not involving ICE. This announcement should not be considered a serious source for an estimate of net migration.

Labor market impacts

Our estimates of migration inflows and outflows have direct implications for labor force growth and job creation. Following our approach from previous work, in this section, we estimate the rate of employment growth that is consistent with full employment for each of our scenarios.

In a typical year, new immigrants do not all enter the labor force immediately. For that reason, the immigration surge in 2022, for example, continues to boost the size of the labor force in 2023 and 2024. That pattern is shown in Figure 4 using survey data through 2024. Interestingly, the most recent immigrant cohorts appear to have higher initial labor force participation rates such that the boost to the labor force happens more quickly.

 

That pattern appears to have been further disrupted in the first part of 2025. A sharp increase in work permit applications from January to April suggests a surge in interest in labor force participation among recent immigrants. Reflecting that, we assume a relatively quick ramp-up of labor force participation among immigrants in early 2025. For immigrants who arrive in the U.S. in the middle of 2025, we assume that the protracted increase in labor force participation happens as in prior years. This is consistent with the approach reflected in the bottom panel of Table 2 in our 2025 AEI Economic Perspectives paper.

Table 1 shows our estimates of monthly employment growth consistent with full employment. As the first few rows of Table 1 show, monthly potential employment growth from 2022 to 2024 was well over 100,000 and by some estimates in 2022 and 2023 close to or even above 200,000. On average, potential employment growth remained above 90,000 during 2025, but the full-year average masks a significant decline over the course of the year.

 f we look solely at the second half of 2025, we estimate the rate of job growth consistent with full employment to have been 20,000 to 50,000 in both of our scenarios. Monthly non-farm payrolls as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics were just modestly below these estimates. With the caveat that the October–November government shutdown affected data collection, non-farm payroll growth averaged around 14,500 in the second half of the year. Over that same period when employment growth was modestly below our estimate of potential employment growth, the unemployment rate has risen by 0.3 percentage points.

 

Looking toward the current calendar year, 2026, we expect the decline in potential employment growth caused by changes to immigration policy to persist. In our low-immigration scenario, monthly growth for the year will average between –20,000 and +20,000 jobs. In our high-immigration scenario, we expect payrolls consistent with full employment to average between 10,000 and 50,000 jobs. These numbers are (even) lower than those of the second half of 2025 and dramatically below those of 2022 through 2024.

Effects on consumer spending and GDP

As in our previous analyses, we can translate our estimates of labor force growth into effects on consumer spending and GDP growth. For short-run GDP growth to change due to a reduction in net migration, labor force growth and earnings need to change. The direct effect on GDP growth owing to less output created by immigrants is roughly 0.2 percentage points in 2025 and 0.1 percentage point in 2026

 

In addition to those direct effects, the reduction in consumer spending by immigrants also further dampens GDP growth. In our assessment, the reduction takes businesses by surprise; in response, those businesses take actions, such as laying people off, which have knock-on effects in reducing GDP.

Consumer spending is dampened for two reasons. First, fewer immigrants are in the U.S.  and therefore are not spending in the U.S. Second, we expect that when immigration enforcement is very salient, immigrants who remain in the U.S. pull back on their spending because they are more uncertain about the future and may minimize going into public for shopping or leisure. Those effects on GDP do not happen immediately, so to some degree, reductions in consumer spending in 2025 continue to dampen GDP growth in 2026.   

The reductions in aggregate consumer spending that result from the change in immigration policy are significant in dollar terms. We estimate that the factors that lower consumer spending by immigrants result in between $40 billion and $60 billion less spending in 2025 than in 2024. In 2026, consumer spending is projected to be further reduced by $10 billion to $40 billion. Those are useful estimates to keep in mind as some businesses report unexpected weakness in consumer demand.

All told, we estimate that the reductions in labor supply and consumer spending from changes to immigration policy affected GDP growth in 2025 by between –0.2 percentage point (high scenario) and –0.3 percentage point (low scenario). For calendar year 2026, the effect will be between –0.1 percentage point (high) and –0.3 percentage point (low). An implicit assumption here is that the Federal Reserve does not loosen monetary policy in response to the lower potential employment growth that results from reduced immigration.

Finally, the effects of the current immigration policy on inflation are likely small. That is because immigration does not just add to labor supply but to demand as well. Businesses experience a reduction in net immigration both as a reduction in labor supply and as a reduction in demand for their goods and services.

Conclusion

Our analysis suggests that the United States experienced negative net migration in 2025 for the first time in at least decades. We estimate net flows of –295,000 to –10,000 for the year. Though a high degree of policy uncertainty remains, continued negative net migration for 2026 is also likely. The slowdown implies weaker employment, GDP, and consumer spending growth.

There has been much speculation about how immigration policy might be affecting the strength of the labor market and the economy, as well as price and wage inflation, and how monetary policy should respond. According to our estimates, employment growth may remain quite weak relative to historical trends. Breakeven monthly employment growth is estimated at 50,000 or less and could well turn negative in 2026.  The unemployment rate will be a better read of whether the labor market is weak owing to business cycle forces that monetary policy can address or simply owing to more constrained immigration.

Certain parts of the economy will see unexpectedly weak economic activity, such as businesses that serve part of the affected immigrant population. Such weakness is the new normal under current immigration policy, rather than weakness reflecting adverse business cycle conditions. As the economy adjusts, more accommodative monetary policy should be used cautiously.

Minnesota School Librarians Supporting Students and Peers by Kara Yorio

 As ICE raids continue in Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN (MSP), the school day is anything but normal. Parents are standing guard and acting as escorts for immigrants and all nonwhite students at drop-off and pickup, recess has often been moved inside while ICE agents stand just outside campuses, schools are facilitating online learning to accommodate children whose families are too scared to let them leave the house, and students are staging walkouts in 

protest. Every aspect of life in the Twin Cities has been impacted, according to those who live there.

In the middle of it all, school librarians are doing what school librarians do: creating and sharing booklists to help process emotions and understand history, teaching media literacy skills to combat rumors, sharing resources, distributing and maintaining electronic devices, and supporting each other personally and professionally.

“I would like to be doing more to support people, but my job is pretty all-encompassing in my life,” a school librarian from the MSP area said. “I’ve been trying to reassure myself withreminders that being a school librarian—connecting kids with diverse stories, helping them build their literacy and critical thinking skills, giving them the tools to see through spin and propaganda—is its own kind of activism. I am giving it everything I have.”

 SLJ was in contact with multiple librarians who wanted to talk—saying they felt not only a catharsis in sharing what they were going through but a need to let people outside of the area know what was happening—but in the end, many changed their mind about speaking because they were afraid. Even offered anonymity, they, and in some cases their administration, feared that what they said would give enough clues to identify immigrant students in their school or reveal security measures the district is taking. They were fearful that speaking to SLJ about how they were supporting students and one another would lead ICE to their doors—of their schools and their homes.

 Inside school buildings, educators are trying to keep things as routine as possible.

“School is a place that needs to be safe and stable,” said a school librarian from a Minneapolis suburb—an outer ring, as they are called in the area. ICE has not been on her campus but has been in the community, albeit not as widespread as in Minneapolis. “We were given the instructions [to] try and maintain regular classroom activities as much as possible.”

Of course, ICE activities and the latest news remain a dominant part of conversations.

 

“Students ask questions, definitely,” she says. “You answer to the best of your ability, [but] don’t let it dominate a whole class period. You don’t know what somebody else is going through, where that might trigger something. Just like in any other crisis, if they need counseling support, we get them to the counseling office. We have students that are not coming to school if they don’t feel safe. We have students that are coming to school, because this is a place that they feel safe.”

Even in an area where ICE interactions might not be daily occurrences on neighborhood streets or in local stores, the impact is significant and disruptive.

 

“Everybody’s scared, everybody’s nervous,” said the librarian. “The teachers are scared for our kids of color. Our staff of color are carrying all their papers just in case.”

Carrying their papers in case they are stopped in the street and forced to prove their citizenship because of the color of their skin —in the United States of America.

“Never did I think that would be something that I would ever have to say,” she added. “I’m frustrated. I’m angry. I’m sad—in disbelief and just so angry that our staff and our students are going through this.”

Her focus is on making sure “that we’re being fierce advocates for our staff and for our students.”

 

In an attempt to continue educating those too afraid to come to school, districts are implementing online learning and hybrid learning on the fly. For people who think that should be easy because the schools went online for COVID in 2020, it is not.

“It’s a very different situation,” said a school librarian.

In Minnesota, when COVID hit, Gov. Tim Walz closed schools for two weeks to give administrators and staff time to plan and develop protocols and procedures. This time, Minneapolis Public Schools decided to allow students to learn online, announcing it over a weekend and beginning it that Monday.

 “In Minneapolis, pretty much all the librarians are canceling any sort of scheduled classes, because they’re getting devices, they’re getting hot spots, they’re doing password resets,” she said.

Many of these families haven’t gone through online learning before, she noted. They don’t know how to join a Google Meet or Zoom, according to the librarian, and instructions must be in English, Spanish, and various other languages to meet the needs of the diverse school communities.

“It’s mass craziness,” she said, adding that librarians are just in “survival mode.”

 

The St. Paul Public Schools closed on Tuesday, January 20, and Wednesday, January 21, for teachers to prepare to begin virtual learning in that district.

School librarians in the area are leaning on one another, but supportive words from outside the area would be appreciated, as well.

‘Please write, please send letters of encouragement and support,” one Minnesota librarian said. “Write not just to schools but to all of Minnesota. Locate an address and write.”

The Information and Technology Educators of Minnesota, the school library division of the Minnesota Library Association, sent an email to the organization’s listserv of Minnesota school librarians, library workers, retired librarians, and community library advocates.

 The email, which was shared with SLJ, began by thanking people for reaching out and offering support and resources to the Minneapolis Public Schools. It shared two "crisis and trauma" booklists, one for elementary students and another for secondary students, with titles to help kids process the situation. It also included ways those outside of the Twin Cities could support affected families and communities, including donating to a local food pantry, assisting an organization that is sending kids free books, patronizing MSP BIPOC-owned and immigrant-owned businesses, and calling legislators.

 The email concluded: “We are librarians. We are teachers. We are Minnesotans. We can do hard things. In the wise words of Teddy Roosevelt, ‘Do what you can, with what you have, where you are.’

“Sending hugs, tissues, and chocolate!”

Trump links Greenland threat to Nobel Peace Prize snub, EU prepares to retaliate by John Irish and Nora Buli

 

PARIS/OSLO, Jan 19 (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump has linked his drive to take control of Greenland to his failure to win the Nobel Peace Prize, saying he no longer thought "purely of Peace" as the row over the island threatened to reignite a trade war with Europe.

Asked by NBC News in a brief telephone interview on Monday if he would use force to seize Greenland, Trump said “No comment,” adding he would "100%" follow through on plans to hit European nations with tariffs without a Greenland deal.

 

Trump has intensified his push to wrest sovereignty over Greenland from fellow NATO member Denmark, prompting the European Union to weigh hitting back with its own measures.

The dispute is threatening to upend the NATO alliance that has underpinned Western security for decades and which was already under strain over the war in Ukraine and Trump's refusal to protect allies which do not spend enough on defence.

Trump's threat has rattled European industry and sent shockwaves through financial markets amid fears of a return to the volatility of 2025's trade war, which only eased when the sides reached tariff deals in the middle of the year.

 

In a text message on Sunday to Norway's Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere, Trump said: "Considering your Country decided not to give me the Nobel Peace Prize for having stopped 8 Wars PLUS, I no longer feel an obligation to think purely of Peace, although it will always be predominant, but can now think about what is good and proper for the United States of America."

Norway's government released the messages on Monday under the country's freedom of information act.

Stoere had sent an initial message on behalf of himself and Finnish President Alexander Stubb, calling for de-escalation of tensions and suggesting a call, eliciting a response from Trump less than half an hour later.

NOBEL COMMITTEE GAVE 2025 PEACE PRIZE TO MACHADO, NOT TRUMP

The Norwegian Nobel Committee annoyed Trump by awarding the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize not to him but to Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado.

 

In his message, Trump also repeated his accusation that Denmark cannot protect Greenland from Russia or China.

"... And why do they have a 'right of ownership' anyway?" he wrote, adding: "The World is not secure unless we have Complete and Total Control of Greenland.”

Trump vowed on Saturday to implement a wave of increasing tariffs from February 1 on EU members Denmark, Sweden, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland, along with Britain and Norway, until the U.S. is allowed to buy Greenland, home to only 57,000 people.

"We are living in 2026, you can trade with people, but you don't trade people," Denmark's Foreign Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen said during a visit to London on Monday.

 

In a post on Facebook, Greenland Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen said the territory should be allowed to decide its own fate.

"We will not let ourselves be pressured. We stand firm on dialogue, on respect and on international law," he said.

Denmark's military told Reuters that planes carrying Danish soldiers and Army Commander Peter Boysen would land in Kangerlussuaq, western Greenland, on Monday, describing it as a "substantial contribution" to the Arctic Endurance military exercise.

TALKS WITH TRUMP IN DAVOS?

Norway's Stoere amended his schedule, announcing that he would attend the World Economic Forum in Davos on Wednesday and Thursday, overlapping with Trump's planned appearance at the annual gathering of the global political and business elite.

Trump is expected to deliver a keynote address on Wednesday in his first appearance at the conference in six years.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said he too would try to meet Trump on Wednesday, adding that a trade dispute was not wanted. "But if we are confronted with tariffs that we consider unreasonable, then we are capable of responding," Merz said.U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said it would be "very unwise" for European governments to retaliate.

"I think it’s a complete canard that the president will be doing this because of the Nobel prize. The president is looking at Greenland as a strategic asset for the United States," he told reporters in Davos.

EU LEADERS TO MEET ON THURSDAY

EU leaders will discuss their options at an emergency summit in Brussels on Thursday. One option is a package of tariffs on 93 billion euros ($108 billion) of U.S. imports that could automatically kick in on February 6 after a six-month suspension.

Another option is the "Anti-Coercion Instrument" (ACI), which has never yet been used and which could limit access to public tenders, investments or banking activity or restrict trade in services, in which the U.S. has a surplus with the bloc, including in digital services.

The EU said it was continuing to engage "at all levels" with the U.S. but said the use of its ACI was not off the table.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer called for calm discussion between the allies, adding that he did not believe Trump was considering military action to seize Greenland.

Russia declined to comment on whether the U.S. designs on Greenland were good or bad but said it was hard to disagree with experts that Trump would "go down in... world history" if he did take control of the island.($1 = 0.8604 euros)